History 1965-71
Prior to 1965,
contingency plans for Southeast Asia
called for the insertion of Marines in the event of an attack on South
Vietnam. After the Gulf of Tonkin crisis in August 1964, U.S. commanders
activated the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (9th MEB).(1)
By early 1965, sensing victory nearly in their grasp, the Communists directed
attacks against U.S. advisors. In February 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson
ordered a series of retaliatory American air strikes against North Vietnam.
As the air war escalated, on 22 February 1965, U.S. Army
General William C. Westmoreland, Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command,
Vietnam (ComUSMACV), asked for two U.S. Marine
battalions to protect the Da Nang base in South Vietnam's I Corps. By the end
of the month, the Johnson administration agreed to the request. Finally, on 7
March 1965, the U.S. Joint Chiefs sent the long awaited signal to land the MEB.(2)
The following day, 8 March, the first wave of Marine Battalion
Landing Team (BLT) 3/9 at Da Nang. On the beach waiting for the Marines
was a host of welcoming South Vietnamese dignitaries and local schoolgirls who
bedecked the 9th MEB commander, Brigadier General Frederick J.
Karch, with a garland of flowers. Indeed one of
the famous newsphotographs of the war shows a dour
General Karch with a lei
around his neck. Karch later stated "When you have
a son in Vietnam and he gets killed, you don't want a smiling general with
flowers around his neck . . . ."(3)
By the end of March 1965, the 9th MEB numbered nearly 5,000 Marines at Da
Nang, including two infantry battalions, two helicopter squadrons, and
supporting units.
Notwithstanding the Marine buildup, the U.S. involvement in
Vietnam remained limited. According to the landing directive: "The U.S. Marine
force will not, repeat will not, engage in day to day actions against the Viet
Cong."(4)
These constrictive conditions lasted for only a brief period. In April, the
President agreed to reinforce and to permit the Marines to engage Communist
insurgents. By early May 1965, the Marines had established two additional
enclaves, one in Chu Lai, 57 miles south of, and
at Phu Bai, 30 miles
north of Da Nang.
By this time, the 9th MEB had become the III Marine Amphibious Force (III
MAF). It consisted of both the 3d Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft
Wing (MAW). In midsummer 1965, in discussions with General Westmoreland,
Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara agreed to deploy additional U.S.
troops both Marine and Army to South Vietnam. In August 1965, the first
elements of the 1st Marine Division arrived at Chu
Lai eventually followed by the division headquarters.
As the war expanded, command arrangements, like the American
commitment, evolved over time without any master plan. Still by the end of
1965, the United States had established the outlines of the complex
command structure which, with minor modifications,
it would fight the remainder of the war. III MAF headed since June by Major
General Lewis W. Walt reported to USMACV (Westmoreland). General Westmoreland
exercised this authority through the U.S. chain of command. Formally MACV was
a unified command directly subordinate to the U.S. Pacific Command under
Admiral Ulysses S. Grant Sharp in Hawaii, but Washington often "cut out
Sharp."(5)
De facto functional and geographic divisions characterized the employment of
the U.S. Armed Forces in Vietnam. The Navy conducted the maritime
anti-infiltration Market Time operations, and shared the air campaign against
North Vietnam with the Air Force. Two U.S. Army Field Forces, Vietnam, under
MACV, were responsible for the American ground war in South Vietnam except for
I Corps. In I Corps, often referred to as "Marine land," III MAF had authority
over all U.S. ground tactical units there. The commander of the U.S. Air Force
Second Air Division, later the Seventh Air Force, as Westmoreland's Deputy for
Air, coordinated the U.S. air war in South Vietnam and provided air support to
U.S. Army and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) forces.
The relationship between III MAF and the U.S. Air Force component
command in South Vietnam was more complex. When in March 1965, General
Westmoreland informed CinCPac that he planned to
place Marine fixed-wing units under the overall operational control of his Air
Force component commander, Admiral Sharp overruled him. In no uncertain terms,
in a message probably drafted for him by Marine Brigadier General Keith B.
McCutcheon, who later became CG 1st MAW, Sharp told Westmoreland that he would
exercise operational control of Marine aviation through III MAF.(6)
While III MAF was under the operational control of MACV, General
Walt also reported directly through Marine channels to the Commanding General,
Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, Lieutenant General Victor H. "Brute''
Krulak for administrative and logistic support.
While not in the operational chain of command, General
Krulak was not one to deny General Walt the benefit of his advice.
Through the same Marine channels, Krulak was
responsible to The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Wallace M. Greene,
Jr., in Washington, who also had his perceptions on the conduct of the war.(7)
From the Marine perspective, in Vietnam and in both Hawaii
and Washington, the III MAF location in the densely populated rice- bowl area
south of Da Nang necessitated a pacification strategy.(8)
On the other hand, General Westmoreland contended that the
introduction of North Vietnamese units into the south created a new situation
and wanted the Marines to engage them. He had doubts about the thrust of the
Marine pacification campaign. According to a MACV analysis, the Marines were
"stalled a short distance south of Da Nang," because the ARVN was unable
to "fill in behind the Marines in their expanding enclaves." On the other
hand, Westmoreland stated that he, "had no desire
to deal so abruptly with General Walt . . . [to] precipitate an
interservice imbroglio."(9)
General Walt also wanted to avoid any confrontation. His basic
position was that he would engage the enemy's main force units, but first he
wanted "to have good intelligence."(10)
Both Generals Krulak in Hawaii
and General Greene in Washington supported General Walt. They voiced their
concerns directly to General Westmoreland and through the command channels
open to them. Although differing in minor details, the two Marine generals in
essence advocated increased pressure upon North Vietnam and basically an "ink
blot" strategy in South Vietnam, combining civic and military efforts.
Generals Greene and Krulak would engage the
Communist regulars for the most part only "when a clear opportunity exists to
engage the VC Main Force or North Vietnamese units on terms favorable to
ourselves."(11)
While the two Marine generals received a hearing of their views,
they enjoyed little success in influencing the MACV strategy or overall U.S
policy toward North Vietnam. According to Krulak,
Secretary McNamara personally told him that the "ink blot" theory was "a good
idea but too slow."
(12)
Despite the differences over pacification and the big unit war
between MACV and the Marines, General Westmoreland's directives were broad
enough to include both approaches and in a sense paper over the real
distinctions between the two. The Marines were to defend and secure their base
areas; to conduct search and destroy missions against VC forces that posed an
immediate threat and against distant enemy bases; to conduct clearing
operations in contiguous areas; and finally, to execute contingency plans
anywhere in Vietnam as directed by ComUSMACV.(13)
Working within these "all-encompassing" objectives, General Walt
developed what he called his "balanced strategy." This
consisted of a three-pronged effort employing search and destroy,
counter-guerrilla and pacification operations. An integral part of his concept
was the Combined Action program, in which III MAF assigned a squad of Marines
to a Vietnamese Popular Forces platoon. The premise was that this integration
of the Vietnamese militia with the Marines would create a bond of mutual
interest between the Americans and local populace. Walt's initial plan called
for III MAF to secure the entire I Corps coastal plain by the end of 1966,
once it joined its two largest enclaves, Da Nang and Chu
Lai.(14)
This soon proved too optimistic. In the
Spring of 1966, an unforeseen internal South Vietnamese political
crisis threw the situation in I Corps into chaos. Through a combination of
tact and firmness, General Walt managed to keep Marine forces uninvolved. For
the Marines, however, their pacification effort south of Da Nang had come to a
complete standstill.(15)
Further in July, the North Vietnamese mounted their first
offensive into South Vietnam directly through the Demilitarized Zone
(DMZ). In response, the 3d Marine Division deployed north to counter. General
Westmoreland, moreover, feared that the North Vietnamese might circumvent the
Marine defenses and attempt to open a corridor in the western border area,
near the Special Forces base at Khe
Sanh. III MAF reluctantly, at the suggestion of
Westmoreland, sent a battalion to Khe
Sanh "just to retain that little prestige of doing
it on your own volition rather than doing it with a shoe in your tail."(16)
By the end of 1966, the two Marine divisions of III MAF were
fighting two separate wars. In the north, the 3d Marine Division fought a more
or less conventional campaign while the 1st Marine Division took over the
counter-guerrilla operations in the populous south. Although by December 1966,
III MAF numbered nearly 70,000 troops, one Marine general summed up the year's
frustrations, " . . . too much real estate--do not have enough troops."
(17)
A proposed anti-infiltration barrier to be established just
south of the DMZ caused further difficulties. Although credited to Secretary
of Defense Robert S. McNamara, the concept of a defensive `barrier'' had many
authors. It received only serious consideration in the
Spring of 1966 when McNamara raised the question
with the Joint Chiefs. In August, a special study group of scientists reported
that a unmanned air-supported barrier could be
established in a year's time.(18)
Despite serious objections by other senior commanders, General
Westmoreland was not all that opposed to the barrier. Despite doubts about an
unmanned barrier, he himself, was thinking of building a manned `strong point
obstacle system." He saw the proposal as an opportunity to institute his own
concept.(19)
The Marine command would be at the center of the project. Very
early, General Walt made known his unhappiness, contending that a barrier
defense `should free Marine forces for operations elsewhere not freeze such
forces in a barrier watching defensive role.''(20)
Having little choice, in April 1967, the 3d Marine Division
began the erection of the strong point obstacle system (SPOS) along the DMZ.
This was dubbed the `McNamara Line,'' but just as easily could have been
called the "Westmoreland line."
(21)
Forced to fill the gap left in southern I Corps, in April as
well, General Westmoreland reinforced the Marines with the Army's Task Force
Oregon, later to become the Americal Division.
The MACV commander also had requested an increase in his overall strength,
planning to reinforce the Marines with at least two Army divisions. Fearful
that these new numbers would necessitate a callup
of the Reserves, Washington in the summer of 1967 cut Westmoreland's request
nearly in half.(22)
With this northward deployment of Marine forces, northern I
Corps became the focus of Marine concern with little prospect of relief. In
April, the Marines had fought an extremely bloody battle with North Vietnamese
regulars for the hills overlooking Khe
Sanh. While there would be a lull in that sector,
the North Vietnamese in the following months would place continuing pressure
upon the 3d Marine Division's fixed positions.(23)
At about this time, the North Vietnamese
Politbureau called for `a decisive blow'' to
`force the U.S. to accept military defeat.''(24)
In the fall of 1967, the Communist forces launched the first phase of their
campaign. In a reverse of their usual tactics, the North Vietnamese mounted
mass assaults lasting over a period of several days. During late September and
early October, the Marine outpost at Con Thien in
the eastern DMZ sector came under both infantry attack and artillery
bombardment. While repulsed at Con Thien, the NVA
continued their offensive through November in South Vietnam's II and III
Corps.(25)
In the DMZ sector, construction of the Strong Point system under
went modification. The 3d Marine Division had made limited progress. Faced
with mounting casualties in November, General Westmoreland approved a major
change to his original plans. In essence, the division was to halt all
construction until `after the tactical situation had stabilized.'' While some
work on strong points continued, the situation never stabilized.(26)
Much evidence indicated that the enemy was on the move. Captured
enemy documents spoke of major offensives throughout South Vietnam. One in
particular mentioned a general offensive and general uprising and directed the
coordination of military attacks `with the uprisings of the local population
to take over towns and cities.''(27)
General Westmoreland, nevertheless, believed the enemy's more
logical targets to be the DMZ and Khe
Sanh. He thought the Communist objectives to be
the seizure of the two northern provinces of South Vietnam and to make
Khe Sanh the American
Dien Bien
Phu.(28)
With the Marines strung out along the DMZ in the north,
Westmoreland deployed the 1st Air Cavalry Division to I Corps. In mid-January
1968, III MAF was in actuality a small field army, consisting of what amounted
to two Army divisions, two reinforced Marine Divisions, a Marine aircraft
wing, and supporting forces, numbering well over 100,000.
(29)
As General Westmoreland reinforced III MAF
in mid-January 1968, he began to have misgivings. General Westmoreland
believed that Marine Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman, Jr., who had
relieved General Walt, was "unduly complacent.''(30)
Westmoreland worried about what he perceived as the Marine command's `lack of
followup in supervision,'' its employment of
helicopters, and its generalship.
(31)
In mid-January 1968, the MACV commander
decided to establish a new forward headquarters to control the war in the
northern two provinces under his deputy, General Creighton W. Abrams.(32)
Although both General Cushman at Da Nang and General
Krulak in Hawaii had their suspicions about Westmoreland's motivations,
the two outwardly acknowledged the validity of the MACV commander to have his
forward headquarters where, he believed the decisive battle of the war was
about to begin.(33)
On 20 January, the North Vietnamese had attacked the Khe
Sanh hill outposts and subjected the main base to
both ground and artillery assaults the following day. They, however, had
neither the capability nor possibly the intention to mount a full out attack.
Instead, the Communist forces launched over the Tet
holidays an offensive unparalleled in the Vietnam War in its sweep and
intensity. From 29-31 January, the Communist forces struck through the length
and breadth of South Vietnam-- everywhere that is except at
Khe Sanh.
In I Corps, the enemy hit all of the major population centers including Da
Nang and Hue. U.S. and Vietnamese troops successfully repulsed all of these
attacks except at Hue. It took 26 days of fierce, determined, house-to-house
fighting for U.S. Marines and soldiers as well as ARVN troops to rid the city
of the invaders.
At Da Nang, the delicate issue over command relations once
more arose complicated by events near Khe
Sanh. While the 1st Marine Division at Da Nang
during Tet had thrown back with heavy losses the
first enemy assaults, on 5-6 February, North Vietnamese battalions from the 2d
NVA Division had penetrated the Da Nang perimeter.(34)
At the same time, North Vietnamese troops overran the Special Forces Camp at
Lang Vei, south of Khe
Sanh.
These two events led to a strange confrontation with General
Westmoreland. Believing that III MAF should have relieved Lang
Vei, General Westmoreland called a special meeting
on 7 February, where he became even more upset as he learned about the
situation at Da Nang.(35)
Apparently, however, General Cushman was unaware of
Westmoreland's unhappiness. His view was that the purpose of the meeting was
to obtain Westmoreland's approval for the reinforcement of Da Nang. In any
event the Marines at Da Nang received the reinforcements. As far as Lang
Vei, Cushman later related that he was "criticized
because I didn't send the whole outfit from Khe
Sanh down there [Lang Vei],
but I decided . . . that it wasn't the thing to do." Intelligence indicated
that the NVA would attempt to ambush any relief force.(36)
By the end of February and the beginning of March with the
securing of the city of Hue, the enemy's countrywide
Tet offensive had about spent its initial bolt. Still while the enemy
offensive failed, public opinion polls in the United States revealed a
continuing disillusionment upon the part of the American public. President
Johnson also decided upon a change of course. On 31 March, President Johnson
announced his decision not to stand for reelection, to restrict the bombing
campaign over North Vietnam, and to authorize only a limited reinforcement of
American troops to Vietnam.(37)
Notwithstanding the mood in Washington and ready to begin
his counter-offensive, General Westmoreland altered again his command
arrangements in I Corps. On 10 March, he disestablished his MACV (Forward)
Headquarters. He replaced it with Provisional Corps whose commander, an Army
lieutenant general, was directly subordinate to III MAF. At the same time,
however, General Westmoreland designated the 7th Air Force commander, as
"single manager for air" and gave him "mission direction" over Marine
fixed-wing aircraft. Despite Marine Corps protests, Westmoreland's order
prevailed. While obtaining major modifications to the ruling, Marine air in
Vietnam would operate under the single manager system to the end of the U.S.
involvement in Vietnam.(38)
With the end of the enemy offensive, the
allies planned to breakout from Khe
Sanh. While North Vietnamese ground forces did not
follow up on their Lang Vei attack, they
incessantly probed the hill outposts and perimeter. Employing innovative air
tactics, Marine and Air Force transport and helicopter pilots kept the base
supplied. Finally on 14 April, the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division reinforced by a
Marine regiment relieved the base. On 14 April, the 77 day "siege" of
Khe Sanh was over.(39)
The North Vietnamese were far from defeated, however, and in early May
launched their "mini-Tet offensive". Except for
increased fighting in the capital city of Saigon, the North Vietnamese May
offensive was largely limited to attacks by fire at allied bases and acts of
terrorism in the hamlets and villages. In I Corps, the major attempt was to
cut the supply lines in the DMZ sector which led to very bloody fighting, but
the defeat again of the North Vietnamese forces.(40)
By mid-1968, the allied forces were on the offensive throughout
I Corps. The closing out of the base at Khe
Sanh in July 1968 permitted the 3d Marine Division
under Major General Raymond G. Davis to launch a series of mobile firebase
operations ranging the length and breadth of the northern border area. In one
of its most impressive operations, Dewey Canyon, the division crossed the
Laotian border in 1969 and destroyed an enemy supply bastion.(41)
From the outset of his Presidency in January 1969, Richard M. Nixon made as
one of his chief aims the reduction of U.S. troop levels in South Vietnam. At
his behest, the Joint Chiefs of Staff developed a plan for the removal of U.S.
forces in six successive stages. The Marine Corps Commandant General Leonard
F. Chapman remembered, "I felt, and I think that most Marines felt, that the
time had come to get out of Vietnam." The first Marine redeployments started
in mid-1969, and by the end of the year the entire 3d Marine Division had
departed.
The end was in sight for the Marine or at least the III MAF
involvement in Vietnam. By the end of March 1970, the number of Marines in
III MAF numbered slightly more than 42,000, a reduction of over half since the
fall of 1969. With the reduced number of Marines in I Corps, III MAF reversed
roles with XXIV Corps and now became a subordinate component of that command.
On 14 April, III MAF shifted its headquarters to Okinawa, leaving
the 13,000 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade in
Vietnam.(42)
At the end of June, the 3d MAB also departed. For all practical purposes, the
Vietnam War reverted to that of an advisory effort for the Marines, except for
the temporary deployment of Marine aviation units in 1972. Finally in April
1975, the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade would enter Saigon to evacuate the
last Americans from the American Embassy to ships of the Seventh Fleet.
For the Marine Corps, like the nation at large and especially for the two
Vietnams, the Communist "Tet Offensive" of 1968,
including the Mini-Tets later in 1968, was the
defining period of the war. While Tet was a
military setback for the Communist forces with the decimation of their Viet
Cong and many of their political cadre in the South, the American government,
people, and military establishment realized that there was no quick solution
to this war. Both the Americans and the North Vietnamese reassessed their
strategy. After the last mini-Tet in the fall of
1968, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong scaled down their large unit war,
both out of weakness and the expectation that the Americans would eventually
withdraw. On the other hand, the United States determined the limits of its
commitment and began to turn over more of the war to the South Vietnamese.
For the Marine Corps, as for all the U.S.
Services, the post Tet period was a "Time of
Troubles" and was in part a motivating factor to be among the first to
redeploy its units from Vietnam. By mid-1968, marijuana use had reached in the
words of one Marine Corps historian, "epidemic" proportions.(43)
Racial tension increased as young Blacks impatient with vestiges of
discrimination forcibly protested. In an almost unprecedented occurrence in
their history, Marines attempted to murder their own officers and
noncommissioned officers using grenades in so- called
fragging incidents. The 1st Marine Division reported 47 such cases in
which resulted in one dead and 47 wounded.(44)
While the Marine Command in Vietnam operated at a high level of operational
effectiveness until its final departure in May of 1971, it too suffered from
the stresses that the long unpopular war had imposed on both the American
people and their Armed Forces. In a sense by being among the first to
redeploy, the Marines escaped the worst aspects of the indiscipline and
organizational breakdown that plagued the residual American forces in Vietnam.
Would the Marine Corps pacification approach have made a difference? This is
one of the unanswered questions of the war. My suspicion is that it probably
would not have, but might have resulted in fewer American casualties. In
reality, the Marine Corps never had an opportunity to practice what it
preached. For the most part, the 3d Marine Division in the thinly populated
DMZ was engaged in a large unit border war. The 1st Marine Division through
1968 was spread too thin to pacify the large Da Nang and
Phu Bai sectors. After 1968, however,
according to American pacification statistics, the Da Nang sector began to
show a diminishing of Communist strength and influence leading one III MAF
commander, Lieutenant General Herman Nickerson, to boast in 1970 that the Viet
Cong "had lost the people war." His successor, however, Lieutenant General
McCutcheon was more skeptical and observed that despite "improved ratings in
the Hamlet Evaluation system," most of the population was "apathetic" in
relation to either the government forces or Communists and considered the
American Vietnamization program as "an
euphemism for U.S. withdrawal." (45) In the end, U.S. forces would leave and
it would be up to the South Vietnamese to save their own country.
1. Jack Shulimson
and Lt Col John J. Cahill, "U.S. Marines in
Vietnam, Jan-Jun65" (unpublished Ms in MCHC).
Back to text
2. Jack
Shulimson and Major Charles M. Johnson, U.S. Marines in
Vietnam, 1965, The Landing and
the Buildup, (Washington, 1978) pp. 7-9, hereafter
Shulimson and Johnson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1965.
Back to text
3. Ibid., p. 12.
Back to text
4. JCS msg to
CinCPac, dtd 6Mar65 as
cited in "Marine Combat Units Go to Da Nang," in Department of Defense, United
States- Vietnam Relations 1965-1967, 12 Bks,
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1971) Bk IV, Sec IV-C-4,
p. 1.Back
to text
5. Mil HistBr, Office of
the Secretary, Joint Staff MACV, Command History, 1967,
Adm Ulysses S. Grant Sharp, USN, CinCPac,
and Gen William C. Westmoreland, USA, ComUSMACV,
Report on the War in Vietnam (As of 30 Jun 1968) (Washington: GPO, 1968), pp.
ii-iii, 79, 156, 291-4, hereafter Sharp and Westmoreland, Report on the War;
Gen William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday &
Co, Inc., 1976), passim, hereafter Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports; Dr. Wayne
Thompson, Air Force History Support Office, Comments on 1968 draft chapter,
dtd 23Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File, MCHC).
Back to text
6. LtGen Keith B.
McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation in Vietnam, 1962- 70," Naval Review 1971
(Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1971), pp. 122-55, pp. 134-36, hereafter
McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation in Vietnam, 1962-70;" Gen Keith B. McCutcheon
intvw, Apr 1971, (Oral
HistColl, MCHC) pp. 1-4, 6; Shulimson and
Johnson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1965, pp. 151-2; Jack
Shulimson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, An Expanding War, 1966,
(Washington: Hist&MusDiv, HQMC 1982), pp. 268-9,
hereafter Shulimson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam,
1966.
Back to text
7. For relations between MACV,
FMFPac, CMC, and III MAF, see Shulimson and
Johnson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1965; Shulimson,
U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1966; and Maj Gary F.
Telfer, LtCol Lane
Rogers, and Victor K. Fleming, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1967: Fighting the
North Vietnamese Army, (Washington: Hist&MusDiv,
HQMC, 1984), passim., hereafter Telfer, Rogers,
and Fleming, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1967.
Back to text
8. Quoted in Capt William D. Parker, U.S. Marine Corps
Civic Action Efforts in Vietnam, April 1966-April 1967 (Washington, 1970), p.
2.
Back to text
9. Shulimson, U.S. Marines
in Vietnam, 1966, p. 13; BGen William E. DePuy,
ACS J-3 memo to Gen Westmoreland, dtd 15Nov65,
Subj: The Situation in I Corps (Gen William E
DePuy Papers, Military History Institute, Carlisle
Barracks, Carlisle, Pa); Gen William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports
(Garden City, N.Y., 1976), pp. 165-66.
Back to text
10. Marine Bgen Edwin H.
Simmons quoted in
Shulimson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam,
1966, p. 14. General Simmons as a colonel in 1965-1966 served as the III MAF
G-3 or operations officer.
Back to text
11. For examples of General Greene's views see: CMC,
Memorandum For the Record, dtd 22Jul65,
Subj: Record of Conference on Southeast Asia held
at White House and CMC, Memorandum for the Record, dtd
7Nov66, Subj: I Corps Estimate ("Force
Requirements and Long Range Estimates for I Corps, RVN" in Operations in
Vietnam Binder, General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., Papers, MCHC). For examples of
General Krulak's views see: "A Strategic
Appraisal" Dec65, Box 4 (LtGen Victor H.
Krulak Papers, MCHC);
CGFMFPac, Pacific Opns. See also
Shulimson,
U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1966, pp. 11-14; Krulak,
First to Fight, An Inside View of the U.S. Marine
Corps (Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press,
1984), pp. 186 and 197-203, hereafter Krulak,
First to Fight.
Back to text
12. General Greene is quoted in
Shulimson,
U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1966, p. 14. See various CMC, Memorandum for the
Record in Operations in Vietnam Binder, Greene Papers relative to his efforts
via the Joint Chiefs and even the President to present the Marine Corps
perspective. For General Krulak, see
Krulak ltr to Hon
Robert S. McNamara, dtd 11Nov65, Box 4,
Krulak Papers and Krulak,
First to Fight, p. 186. Interestingly enough, former Secretary McNamara makes
no mention of this letter or these conversations with
Krulak in his memoir, Robert S. McNamara with Brian
VanDeMark, In Retrospect, The Tragedy and Lessons
of Vietnam (New York: Time Books, Random House, Inc., 1995), passim.
Back to text
13. ComUSMACV
ltr to CGIIIMAF, dtd
21Nov65, Subj: Letter of Instruction, encl 2, III
MAF ComdC, Nov65.
Back to text
14.
Shulimson,
U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1966, p. 16.
Back to text
15. Ibid., pp. 73-91.
Back to text
16. Ibid., pp. 139-198.
Back to text
17. Bgen
Lowell E. English intvw by
FMFPac, n.d. (No 402,
OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC)
Back to text
18. For this and following paragraphs on the barrier
see Jack Shulimson, "The 3d Marine Division and
the Barrier," MS, Chapter 2 of Shulimson, U.S.
Marines in Vietnam, 1968. There were at least three barrier proposals before
the American intervention in 1965.
Back to text
19. ComUSMACV
msg to DCPG, dtd
25Sep66, as quoted
in
Shulimson,
U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1966, p. 316.
Back to text
20. LtGen Lewis W. Walt
ltr to LtGen H. W.
Buse, Jr., dtd 29
Dec66, as quoted in Ibid., p. 318.
Back to text
21.
Shulimson,
U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1966, pp. 314-18; Telfer,
Rogers, Fleming, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1967, 86-94.
Back to text
22. The Pentagon Papers, The Defense Department
History of United States Decisionmaking on
Vietnam, The Senator Gravel Edition, 4 vols
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1975), vol 4., pp. 285-89
hereafter, The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition; MACV
ComdHist, 1967, pp. 143-49; Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, pp.
227-230; Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point, Perspectives of the Presidency,
1963-1969 (New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1971), pp. 369-71, hereafter
Johnson, The Vantage Point.
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23.
Capt
Moyers
S. Shore, II, The Battle for Khe
Sanh (Washington, 1969), p. 17, hereafter Shore,
The Battle for Khe Sanh.
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24. War Experiences Recapitulation Committee of the
High-Level Military Institute, The Anti-U.S. Resistance War for National
Salvation, trans by Foreign Broadcast Information
Service (Hanoi: People's Army Publishing Houses, 1980) [Joint Publications
Research Service No. 80968, dtd 3Jun82], pp.
100-01. For speculation about North Vietnamese internal differences, see Pike,
`The Other Side;" P.J. Honey, `The Offensive, Hanoi's Change of Strategy,''
clipping from China News Analysis, dtd 22Mar68 and
V. Zorza, `Hints from Hanoi,'' Clipping Washington
Post, dtd 10Oct68 (A&S Files, Indochina Archives);
Donald Oberdorfer, Tet!
(Doubleday & Company, Inc, 1971), pp. 42-46, hereafter
Oberdorfer, Tet!;
Col Dave R. Palmer, Summons of the Trumpet, (San Rafael, California: Presidio
Press, 1978), 163-7; MACV ComdHist 1967, p. 74.
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25. CGFMFPac
msgs to CGIIIMAF, dtd
23 and 27Sep67 (HQMC
Msg File); MACV ComdHist,
1967, pp. 75, 98.
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26. For a detailed look at the barrier see
Shulimson, "The 3d Marine Division and the
Barrier", draft chapter, "U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1968" MS.
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27. `Dissemination of Order for the
General Offensive and the General Uprising,'' Trans of enemy document,
dtd
12Nov67 (A&S Files, Indochina Archives).
See also MACV ComdHist, 1968, pp. 881-3.
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28. Westmoreland, A Soldier
Reports, p. 316.
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29. III MAF ComdC, Jan
1968.
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30. Westmoreland, A Soldier
Reports, p. 342.
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31. Bgen
John R. Chaisson, Diary, entries for 26-28 Jan68 (Chaisson
Papers). For relationship between Cushman and Westmoreland, see
Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 342; Cushman
intvw, 82, passim.
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